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Abstract
We develop an early-warning system for the formation of disproportional dominance in complex systems. Assuming that the growth
dynamics is captured by proportional growth, we describe the system with fitness-adjusted preferential attachment, where the id-
iosyncratic system dynamics is conveniently absorbed into the fitness term. Allowing also for targeted deletion and ‘parametrizing’
the space of fitness distributions with the Beta-distribution, we derive an exact 4-dimensional phase diagram that separates the sys-
tem into two regimes: the ‘fit-get-richer’ (FGR) and the ‘winner-takes-all’ (WTA). By calibrating the system’s four parameters with
maximum likelihood, we can measure in real-time its distance from the unfavorable WTA regime. This is demonstrated by applying
the theory to the eToro social trading platform, where traders can imitate each other, thus giving rise to systematic instabilities if
one or a few traders become too popular. We show how to effectively and cost-efficiently prevent the formation of WTA agents
through an optimal transformation along a geodesic path in the space of the fitness distributions. The common counter-measure of
stopping the most dominant agents from growing further does not solve sustainably the problem of drastic inequality. Instead, we
demonstrate that interventions that jump-start low-fitness individuals to transform them into high fitness agents is the best way to
avoid swelling inequality and escalating fragility.
In just about a decade, a handful of companies have con-
tributed to an alarmingly centralized world wide web. Google
and Facebook directly influence over 70% of internet traffic [1].
This hardly resembles the internet’s founding credo of net neu-
trality. Dominance on the internet is not self-contained, but
transcends the economy as a whole. For instance, in digital
advertising, almost 60% of spending went to Google and Face-
book in 2016. Amazon accounted for 43% of e-commerce sales
in the United States that same year. And even beyond economic
concerns, such unprecedented digital monopolies have impor-
tant implications for journalism, politics, and society [2].
But how can one tell that a company is too large? At what
point should regulators interfere and how? We derive answers
to these questions, using a framework that is largely indepen-
dent of the system under scrutiny. At the heart of this frame-
work is the ubiquitous law of proportional growth, stating that
a firm’s growth rate is proportional to its size. We thus con-
sider a system of agents, whereby the rate at which any given
agent establishes connections to other agents is proportional to
its already existing number of connections, accounting also for
the agent’s intrinsic fitness in attracting connections. This rep-
resentation applies to of a large class of interacting systems [3],
and is known to carry a risk of centralization [4], in the sense
that removal of a few dominating agents would collapse the en-
tire system. We derive a systematic classification of system
states for which such unfavorable centralization occurs. De-
tailed knowledge of the microscopic system dynamics is not re-
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quired. We show how to map a system of interacting agents to
a phase-space in which we measure the ‘distance’ to a regime
of overwhelming centralization. This allows us to anticipate
the emergence of overly dominant agents ex ante and construct
methods for early intervention. Currently, governments address
centralization issues with progressive taxes, anti-trust laws and
similar legislation. However, our analysis reveals that such an
approach may be too naive because it addresses only the symp-
toms - disproportionally dominant firms - rather than the under-
lying cause - a fundamentally imbalanced market that cataly-
ses such dominance. Instead of punishing the most competitive
firms, one should foster more balanced competition by improv-
ing the relative fitness of under-represented agents.
1. Fitness-Based Proportional Growth & Deletion
In this section, we propose an exact criterion specifying the
conditions for which the dominance of an agent (firm, city, web-
site, individual, etc.) becomes overwhelming.
1.1. Model definition
Aiming at a generic description, proportional growth [5–7],
is the natural first building block. It is appropriate to add to
it a fitness-based proportional attachment [8], which has been
shown [3] to be particularly suitable to describe growth dynam-
ics in complex systems.
We thus consider an undirected network that is growing by
attaching one node per unit time to an already existing network.
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At each time step t = 1, 2, 3, . . ., a new node is added to the net-
work by attaching it to m randomly chosen vertices. Each node
ni has an intrinsic fitness ηi ∈ (0, 1) sampled from some (gener-
ally unknown) fitnesses distribution ρ. Denote by ki the number
of edges connected to node ni, i.e. its degree. We assume that
an edge of a newly introduced node attaches to ni with probabil-
ity proportional to the product of i’s degree and fitness (∝ ηiki).
The fitter and the more connected a node, the more attractive it
is.
To add one more realistic, yet generic assumption, we allow
nodes to be removed from the system (failure, death, etc.) [9].
At each time step, we remove a node from the network with
probability cηωi , where c is a positive constant and η
ω
i accounts
for the dependence of the probability of failure on the fitness of
the node. The sign of the exponent ω determines whether more
or less fit nodes are more likely to fail. For ω > 0, the fit nodes
are more likely to fail, for instance due to targeted attacks. For
ω < 0, weak nodes are more likely to fail. This is reasonable
for instance if we interpret η itself as a measure of robustness
with respect to failure.
Assuming that the i-th node is still alive at time t, the rate at
which its degree ki changes reads
∂ki
∂t
= m
ηiki
S (t)
− c
1 − c
〈η〉ω
〈ηω〉
ki
t
(1)
where S is a normalization factor and expectation values 〈·〉
are taken over the fitness distribution ρ. The first term in the
right hand side of equation (1) is a direct consequence of the at-
tachment rule described above, and m accounts for the m edges
of the new node. The second factor is a product of two inde-
pendent probabilities: the probability ∼ c 〈η〉ω that a node is
deleted, and the probability ∼ ki/t that node ni is connected to
that failed node. A detailed derivation of this equation is found
in the supplementary information (SI). 1
1.2. The fit-get-richer (FGR) and the winner-takes-all (WTA)
regimes
The growth mechanism embodied in expression (1) gives rise
to two distinct asymptotic regimes: the fit-get-richer (FGR) and
the winner-takes-all (WTA). In the later, the system is largely
dependent and controlled by just a few agents. This regime
is analogous to a Bose-Einstein condensate in statistical quan-
tum mechanics [4, 10] and the dominant agents are known
as ‘dragon-kings’ in socio-economics [11] and complex sys-
tems [12]. The notion of disproportional dominance manifests
in the node degree of those agents (representing their influ-
ence/importance/wealth/. . . ). This is made rigorous as follows:
there exists at least one node nDK whose degree kDK does not
decay to zero relative to the total number of edges E in the limit
of infinite system size. Since E ∼ (1 − c)t, this means that
limt→∞ kDK/t > 0 i.e. agent DK’s number of connections scales
linearly with the system size. Even as the system grows to in-
finity, a finite fraction of links is controlled by those agents.
1The SI is available from the authors upon request.
The influence of such a node is felt in the entire system no mat-
ter what the total size of the network (Figure 1(a)). From a
stability point of view, the system is then strongly reliant on a
few nodes, and might collapse if those fail. From an economic
point of view, the dominance of these agents does not vanish
as the economy grows. Instead, their actions affect the entire
economy, reminiscent of the companies mentioned in the intro-
duction.
As shown in the SI, the WTA regime occurs if and only if
I∗ ≡
1∫
0
dη
ρ(η)
ξ
ξω+〈η〉ω+ 1−cc 〈ηω〉
( 〈η〉η+ 1−cc 〈ηω〉
η
+ 1
η1−ω
)
− 1
< 1 (2)
where ξ is a constant that depends on ρ, c and ω, but is typi-
cally close to 1. Importantly, condition (2) depends on the fit-
ness landscape ρ as a whole, and not just on the fitness of a
few agents. This implies that acting on the dominant agents by
removing many of their links or targeting their growth specif-
ically is not effective: this may transiently decrease their in-
fluence but is short-lived as the growth dynamics leads to the
resurgence of new agents that dominate. Similar results hold
for explosive percolation [13]. In order to prevent the occur-
rence of unwanted winners-take-it-all agents, one should act on
the fitness landscape ρ as a whole.
2. Phase Diagrams and Fitness Distributions
2.1. Parametric Regime Classification
Equation (2) shows that the appearance of WTA agents de-
pends on the deletion parameters c and ω, as well as the entire
distribution of fitnesses ρ. In order to classify the possible dif-
ferent regimes, we propose to explore the space of fitness dis-
tributions parameterized by the Beta-distribution whose density
is given by
fα,β(η) =
1
B(α, β)
ηα−1 (1 − η)β−1 (3)
where α, β > 0 and B is the normalizing Beta-function. Varying
α and β, all shapes of practical interest can be sampled, see
Figure 1(b).
The winner-takes-all (WTA) condition (2) can now be ex-
pressed as a function of four parameters {α, β, ω, c}, via the
function I∗(α, β, ω, c) and the two corresponding regimes are
FGR (I∗ > 1) and WTA (I∗ < 1). In general, the integration
in (2) with ρ given by the Beta-density (3) has to be solved nu-
merically. Figure 1(c) shows the domain of existence for the
WTA and FGR regimes, for different preferential deletion pa-
rameters c and ω in the space of the parameters (α, β). The
WTA regime is found to lie above a line parametrized by (c, ω).
Comparing with Figure 1(b), we see that the WTA regime cor-
responds to fitness landscapes in which the bulk of the nodes
have low fitness. This concentration is enhanced for smaller ω
and for larger c, parameters favoring the failure of low fitness
agents. In contrast, for large ω, the fit-get-richer (FGR) regime
increases in importance, as more fit agents tend to be removed
by targeted attacks. The larger c is, the stronger is this effect.
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Figure 1: (a) Fraction kDK/E of links connected to the most dominant agent nDK in the system, as a function of the total number of agents. The mean values and
± one standard deviation bands are obtained over a sample of 100 realizations. We have fixed c = 1% and ω = 0. Two different fitness distributions are used, one
in the WTA and one in the FGR regime (red and blue cross in panel (c)). (b) Beta distribution density (3) for different parameters α and β used to parametrize the
class of fitness distributions on [0, 1]. As α and β vary, all typically relevant shapes of the fitness distribution are sampled. The WTA regime is characterized by the
bulk of the probability mass being concentrated on agents of low fitness, with only few fit agents that end up dominating the system (e.g. α = 2, β = 5). (c) Phase
diagram showing the domains of existence for the fit-get-richer (FGR) and the winner-takes-all (WTA) regimes, for different preferential deletion parameters c and
ω in the space of the parameters (α, β) of the Beta-fitness distribution (3). The WTA regime corresponds to values where I∗ < 1 (equation (2)). This WTA regimes
lies above a line parametrized by (c, ω). (d) Geodesic with respect to Wasserstein-2 metric, i.e. cost minimizing interpolation from a Beta distribution in the WTA
regime to a Beta distribution in the FGR regime. The (approximate) path in the space of Beta-distributions is shown in panel (c). (e) Distributions along the shortest
path with respect to the Euclidean distance in the (α, β)-plane (cf. dashed line in panel (c)). For generic transportation cost functions, this intervention policy is
more expensive than the Wasserstein geodesic.
2.2. Phase diagram representation of the dynamics on the
eToro social trading platform
eToro is a social trading and multi asset brokerage company.
It provides easy access to trade different assets, in particular
forex, and offers up to 400 times leverage for both long and
short positions. The feature that most distinguishes eToro from
other trading platforms is its OpenBook social investment plat-
form, which enables investors to view, follow and copy the net-
work’s top traders automatically. In other words, instead of ex-
ecuting their own trades, users can chose to ‘follow’ one or sev-
eral other traders and automatically execute the same trades.
The eToro platform can be represented by our model, where
each trader is a node, and the number of traders following a
given trader i defines its degree ki. Then, we assume that the
rate pi of new attachments (followers of agent i) is proportional
to ki, with the proportionally coefficient defining the fitness ηi
of agent i: ηi = pi/ki. In this way, by measuring agent i’s pop-
ularity (degree ki) as well as its current rate of attraction (rate
of attachment pi), one can infer an effective fitness (ηi ∝ pi/ki)
without detailed knowledge of the underlying system dynam-
ics. The access to all the active accounts and traders allows us a
faithful reconstruction of the underlying network. After having
inferred the fitness of every agent, we construct an empirical
fitness distribution, which is then fitted by the Beta-distribution
(3) via maximum likelihood to obtain the parameters αˆ and βˆ.
Similarly, the deletion parameters cˆ and ωˆ are inferred from di-
rect observation. This then allows us to determine the location
of the eToro social trading network in the phase diagram of Fig-
ure 1, at a given time. See SI for details. As agents learn and
evolve, we expect the fitnesses of the agents, and thus the fitness
distribution, to be time-varying. The representative point in the
phase diagram of Figure 1 is thus a function of time, i.e., the pa-
rameters
(
αˆt, βˆt
)
in the (α, β) phase-space are time-dependent.
This dynamics opens the possibility of predicting future states
and of control (see below), in particular when the representa-
tive point
(
αˆt, βˆt
)
may be drifting towards the unwanted WTA
domain. We note that the above methodology to map the dy-
namics of a growth social network onto our fitness-based pro-
portional growth model can also be implemented to incomplete
or noisy data, as the regime classification depends only on the
distribution of fitnesses as a whole.
Figure 2(a) shows the evolution of the eToro network in the
(α, β) plane from April 1st, 2013 to August 1st, 2013, obtained
by the above procedure. A straight line, corresponding to I∗ = 1
as defined in equation (2), separates the WTA regime (red back-
ground) from the FGR regime (grey background). This bound-
ary line has been calculated by assuming that c = 0, which is
a good approximation, as shown in figure 2(b): the empirically
observed rate of deletion (trader disappears from the platform)
is indeed very low. The preferential deletion parameter ω is
found consistently negative (around ω ≈ −0.55), indicating that
traders of low fitness are more likely to abandon the platform.
The representative point in the (α, β) plane starts on April 1st,
2013 in the FGR domain, then enters the WTA domain early
May 2013 and re-enters the FGR regime in late June.
The evolution of associated fitness distributions is shown in
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Figure 2: (a): Evolution of the eToro network in the (α, β) plane from April 1st, 2013 to August 1st, 2013, obtained by the procedure explained in the text. The
straight line separates the WTA regime (red background) from the FGR regime (grey background). (b) Time evolution of parameters c and ω. (c) Distributions of
fitnesses at three times encoded with colors matching the time evolution of panel (a). (d) Degree distribution of the eToro network at the same three times as panel
(c). (e) Time evolution of the parameter I∗ (left axis), compared with the horizontal line at I∗ = 1 that separates the two regimes (FGR for I∗ > 1 and WTA for
I∗ < 1). The inter-quantile range of the profit distribution (measured in USD per trade) is also plotted in panel (e) (right axis).
Figure 2(c) at three times encoded with colors matching the
time evolution of panel (a): beginning of the time period (April
1st, 2013), middle time (June) and end of the time period (Au-
gust 1st, 2013). As predicted from theory, the fitnesses deep
inside the WTA regime (June 2nd) corresponds to the presence
of only few very fit agents. The distribution of fitnesses has a
bimodal structure at the beginning of the dynamics in the FGR
domain, and a more richly populated high fitness tail at the end
of the dynamics also in the FGR domain. Figure 2(d) plots
the complementary cumulative distribution function (ccdf) of
degrees ki over all traders on the eToro platform at the three
times described in panel (c). One can observe that the drift into
the WTA domain is associated with a heavier-tailed distribu-
tion, which prevails even after the system has re-entered into
the FGR domain. We predict that, if the system had remained
in the WTA regime, we would ultimately observe a concentra-
tion of the mass of the distribution of fitnesses on a few agents
in the far right tail.
The dynamics of the eToro network in the (α, β) plane is
smooth and approximately differentiable, which expresses a de-
gree of persistence and thus the possibility to predict by extrap-
olation. The time dynamics can also be characterized by the
evolution of the parameter I∗ defined in (2), which is shown in
Figure 2(e) (left axis). The horizontal line at I∗ = 1 separates
the two regimes (FGR for I∗ > 1 and WTA for I∗ < 1). The
crossings of the line I∗ = 1 thus coincide with the transitions
between the two domains shown in Figure 2(a). As the network
dynamics enters in the WTA domain, the executed trades are
more concentrated on a few assets and orders, as only a hand-
ful of fit agents see their trades imitated by followers. Such
a concentration of trades manifest itself in a wider profit dis-
tribution, as these concentrated trades are less statistically di-
versified. This is visualized on the right axis of Figure 2(e)
showing that, after having entered the WGA regime, the inter-
quantile range of the profit distribution (measured in USD per
trade) widens.
3. Real-Time Control of Disproportional Dominance
The analysis of theToro social trading network in the previ-
ous section showed an instance where the network started in the
FGR regime, then evolved to enter the WTA regime and quickly
re-entered spontaneously the FGR. This may be attributed to
the fast-paced competition and the large contribution of luck
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(stochasticity) inherent to financial trading [14, 15]. Seemingly
overly fit traders may temporarily emerge essentially out of a
streak of luck, and then vanish as quickly as they have appeared.
In other words, the dynamics of the fitnesses themselves is
fast and stochastic enough such that no systematic monopoly
emerges where a few agents completely dominate.
In more slow paced, large-scale economic systems, the re-
entrance into the FGR domain may not occur spontaneously.
Even more problematic are systems where agents can further
increase their fitness as a consequence of their already prevail-
ing dominance, meaning that the fitness grows as a function
of itself (e.g. large firms acquiring smaller firms or using their
monopoly position to prevent new entrants to compete). In such
situations, an external regulator (e.g. the state) may wish to
intervene to ensure greater opportunities for new entrants and
less inequality. Interventions only targeting the most dominant
nodes may appear ‘unfair’, as it punishes arguably highly fit
agents. Perhaps more important, such intervention is inefficient
in light of equation (2), which shows that the emergence of the
WTA regime is a consequence of the distribution of fitnesses as
a whole. Hence, more holistic distribution-wide interventions
are called for. In particular, as inferred from panel (b) and (c)
in Figure 1, it is the high population of weak nodes that needs
to be addressed.
Relying again on our parametrization of the fitness space in
terms of the Beta-distribution (3), we formulate the regulator’s
intervention as an action that aims to modify the distribution
of fitnesses. Mathematically, this amounts to the problem of
shifting optimally the distribution from an initial shape charac-
terized by (α0, β0) for instance inside or uncomfortably close to
the WTA regime to another shape represented by (α1, β1) inside
the FGR domain (see Figure 1(c)). Practically, this amounts
to increasing the concentration of high-fitness agents relative to
low-fitness agents (e.g. in form of subsidies, start-up promo-
tion, and so forth). Technically, we formulate the intervention
technique as an optimal transport problem, seeking the most
cost efficient way of transforming one distribution into another.
We assume that increasing an agent’s fitness from η1 to η2 is
associated with a cost c(η1, η2) = |η1 − η2|δ for some exponent
δ > 0. The problem then amounts to finding a transport map
τ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] that pushes fα0, β0 (·) onto fα1, β1 (·) while mini-
mizing the total cost
1∫
0
dη c(η, τ(η)) fα0, β0 (η). Denote by Fα,β(·)
the cumulative distribution function of the Beta function (3),
and by Qα,β(·) ≡ F−1α,β(·) its inverse (quantile) function. It can
be shown [16] that the cost minimizing transport map τ is of the
form τ(η) = Qα1, β1 (Fα0, β0 (η)). For δ = 2, the interpolation from
fα0, β0 (·) to fα1, β1 (·) is equivalent to a geodesic path with respect
to the Wasserstein-2 metric. It is parametrized by
ft(η) =
∂τt
∂η
fα1, β1 (τt(η)) (4)
with τt = t η + (1 − t) τ(η) and t is running from 0 to 1. Hence,
ft(η) interpolates from f0(η) = fα0, β0 (η) to f1(η) = fα1, β1 (η)
through the space of fitness distributions along a geodesic path
with respect to the Wasserstein-2 metric (Figure 1(d)). We can
again approximate any intermediate distributions ft(η) as Beta-
distribution with parameters (αt, βt) (see SI for mathematical
details). This traces out a path t 7→ (αt, βt) that can be inter-
preted as the most cost-efficient intervention plan. In Figure
1(c), such a geodesic path is shown, starting from the red cross
deep in the WTA domain and ending on the blue cross in the
FGR domain. Panel (d) of Figure 1 presents a sequence of snap-
shots for the distribution of fitnesses, as it changes along the op-
timal path. This geodesic in the distribution space deviates very
strongly from the naive solution of taking a straight path in the
2-dimensional (α, β) plane (which would be the geodesic with
Euclidean distances). As already mentioned, the WTA regime
corresponds to a low-fitness population with a few high fitness
individuals, who eventually become winners that ‘take it all’.
The most cost efficient intervention (Wasserstein geodesic) can
be seen as progressively populating the high fitness part of the
distribution, while at the same time depleting the low fitness re-
gion. In contrast, the shorter straight line (Euclidean geodesic)
would correspond to first building a large pool of agents with
intermediate fitnesses (Figure 1(e)). Thus, the optimal interven-
tion amounts to jump-start the population and transform it by
avoiding a kind of middle-fitness trap. We thus see the impor-
tance of vigorous holistic interventions, which both work on the
full distribution of fitnesses, and focus on jump-starting the low
fitness individuals to transform them into high fitness agents. In
our model, this is the best way to avoid swelling inequality and
escalating fragility.
4. Conclusions
Starting from the generic assumption that a system of inter-
acting agents grows based on fitness adjusted preferential at-
tachment and deletion (1), we have presented an exact condition
(2) at which the system undergoes a transition from a fitness-
controlled distribution of success to a regime in which success
is highly concentrated on a few agents (dragon-kings). That
condition depends not only on the deletion parameters c and
ω, but, more importantly, on the full distribution of fitnesses
ρ(η). We have parametrized the space of fitness distributions
on [0, 1] in terms of the Beta-distribution (3) with two param-
eters α and β (Figure 1(b)). As depicted in Figure 1(c), the
system’s 4-dimensional phase space (α, β, c, ω) has been shown
to exhibit two regimes: the fit-get-richer (FGR) and the winner-
takes-all (WTA). By measuring existing connections and the
rate of new attachments, we showed how to measure the fitness
of each agent in the growing system. We then characterized a
given network by calibrating the reconstructed distribution of
fitnesses to the Beta distribution, which its two parameters α
and β. The evolution of empirical estimates
(
αˆ, βˆ, cˆ, ωˆ
)
allowed
us to track the system’s ‘distance’ from the unstable winner-
takes-all regime in real-time. We have applied this methodol-
ogy to the eToro social trading platform (Figure 2). Finally, we
have derived an optimal, cost-minimizing intervention policy
(4) that targets the least fit agents in the system.
Given the generic set-up and straightforward implementa-
tion, our methodology has the potential of becoming a standard
5
tool for dynamic risk monitoring in interacting systems rang-
ing from small scale trading platforms up to globally intercon-
nected social and economic systems.
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